Introduction
Suppose that there are norms which govern the act of asserting and determine when it is appropriate or otherwise to perform that act. Those norms would surely be of interest to philosophers of language. Assertion seems in some sense to be one of the fundamental speech acts and clarity about the standards to which it is subject ought to shed light on the nature of that act and its relations to others. In turn, reflection on the standards for assertion might inform theories of what determines the contents assertions express or the meanings of the linguistic vehicles used to express them.
* Thanks to Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, an audience at Edinburgh, and anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am grateful to Philosophy and the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Southampton for supporting a period of leave during which I was able to work on this material. 1 McCarthy 2002: 596. (K) One may assert that p if and only if one knows that p
The knowledge view is without doubt the most prominent in the recent literature.
Arguably its main rival at present is the justification view, according to which:
7 Cf. Gert's distinction between 'requiring' and 'justifying' reasons (2004) . 8 For endorsements of (K-NEC) (to use obvious labelling), see Adler 2002; Adler 2009; Engel 2002: §3.5; Fricker 2006; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008; Reynolds 2002; Stanley 2005: 10-11; Turri 2010; and Unger 1975: 252ff . For an endorsement of (K-SUFF), see Fantl and McGrath 2009 . With the exception of DeRose (2002) , advocates of (K) are more difficult to pin down. Hawthorne (2004: 21-24 ) explicitly advances (K-NEC), but a cautious footnote (n58) suggests he might also accept (K-SUFF). Williamson (2000) focuses on (K-NEC), but seems to accept (K-SUFF) when he writes, 'the propositions which one is permitted to assert outright are exactly those which' one knows (2000: 11) . It is possible to read Brandom (1994: ch. 4 ) as arguing for (K). Bird's remarks (2007: §5) strongly suggest he would accept (K). Finally, Sutton (2007: 44-48 ) explicitly endorses (K-NEC) but, given his view that justification is knowledge, a commitment to (K-SUFF) might follow. This list is not exhaustive.
Williamson is right, I think, that 'our attitude to false assertions is misrepresented by any simple account on which what warrants assertion does not entail truth ' (2000: 263) . Equally, I would add, any such account misrepresents our attitude to true assertions. However, since the focus of this paper lies elsewhere, I
shall not pursue this issue. Accordingly, I shall set (B), (BK) and (JBK) aside, and I shall consider (JB) at various points only as a non-fundamental norm governing assertion, i.e. as derived in some way from (T).
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Despite an explosion of interest in assertion and its norms in recent years, philosophers have made almost no effort to resuscitate (T) in the face of the numerous and apparently serious problems facing it. In this paper, I shall defend the truth view 9 (JB) is really a schema which can be filled in in various ways depending on how one understands justification. On certain ways of filling it in, (JB) is simply a restatement of (K) (e.g. Sutton 2007 ). Typically, however, justification for believing that p is understood as requiring less than knowledge. Defenders of some version of (JB-NEC) include Hill and Schechter (2007) , Douven (2006) , for whom justification is rational credibility, Kvanvig (2009; 2011) , for whom justification must be knowledgeaffording, and Lackey (2007) , for whom justification is reasonableness. 10 See Bach 2008. 11 I do not know of anyone who advances (BK). Should one be tempted, see (Williamson 2000: §11.5 ). 12 Koethe (2009) defends something like this principle. 13 Adler (2009) presents an argument against a version of (JB), according to justification is rational credibility. Very roughly, he considers a case in which A asserts that p or q, and B asserts that not-q. B's assertion, Adler points out, does not constitute a challenge to A's but is complimentary to it; in light of it, A might proceed to assert that p. This is not what one would expect if rational credibility were the standard for assertion, since its being rationally credible that not-p weakens the rational credibility of p or q. Adler suggests that this supports the knowledge view, though it equally supports the truth view.
and, in doing so, reject the knowledge view. First, I shall consider the data typically cited in support of the knowledge view, data which it appears the truth view cannot accommodate. Second, I shall outline and reject what is-to my knowledge at leastthe only attempt to show that the truth view can account for this data, namely, Weiner's (2005) . Third, I shall make my case for the truth view and against the knowledge view.
Attempts in the contemporary literature to undermine the knowledge view depend almost exclusively on alleged counterexamples to (K), generating which has become something of a cottage industry. 14 While it no doubt has a role to play, such a strategy relies on intuitions concerning hypothetical cases, intuitions which might not be shared and which might shift depending on how the relevant cases are fleshed out.
Rather than appealing to potential counterexamples, I shall reject (K) on principled grounds. To do so, I shall introduce a distinction, which, though not familiar from debates concerning the norms of assertion, is acknowledged in the philosophy of normativity and practical reason, namely, the distinction between there being reason or warrant for a subject (not) to φ, in a sense to be specified, and a subject's having reason or warrant (not) to φ, in a sense to be specified. By appealing to that distinction I shall show, first, that the proponent of the truth view is able to accommodate the data that seems otherwise to point toward the knowledge view and, second, that the knowledge view is mistaken. My argument has the added advantage of showing why, although it is false, the knowledge view might appear to be true. Hence, it simultaneously undermines the view while accounting for the attraction it exerts.
14 See, for example, Brown 2008; Brown 2010; Hill and Schechter 2007; Lackey 2007; Lackey 2011; Levin 2008; and Weiner 2005. After addressing some possible responses to my arguments, I shall conclude by offering some (admittedly speculative) remarks on what might explain the fact that there is an act, assertion, governed by (T).
The data
In this section, I shall outline the considerations which proponents of the knowledge view adduce in its support and in opposition to the truth view. Some have tried to
show that some version of (JB) can also accommodate this data. 15 Be that as it may, the important point for present purposes is that, to all appearances, the truth view cannot. 16 Brown (2008; notes that the data, at best, supports (K-NEC), not (K-SUFF). That might be true, but it offers no comfort to the proponent of the truth view-if knowledge is insufficient for warranted assertion, so is truth.
It is typically legitimate to respond to assertions by saying, 'How do you know?' or, 'Do you know that?' Moreover, these remarks are not heard merely as requests for information but as challenges, challenges which would be met if the asserter could show that or how she knows. If the truth view were correct, such challenges would seem excessive and failure to meet them could hardly be grounds for criticism. In contrast, the knowledge view has an easy explanation for these conversational patterns, namely, (K).
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Next, consider Moorean assertions. Suppose that Holly asserts flat-out:
(1) Dogs bark, but I don't know that dogs bark.
15 See Douven 2006; Hill and Schechter 2008; Lackey 2007; Kvanvig 2009; and Kvanvig 2011. 16 Several of the attempts to account for the relevant data consistently with the justification view appeal to the (Gricean) pragmatic norms governing conversational exchange. In §3, I argue that this kind of strategy does not look very promising. 17 For versions of this argument, see Adler 2002: 36; Reynolds 2002: 140; Unger 1975: 263; Sutton 2007: 44; and Williamson 2000: 252-253. Brown (2008: 4; 2010: §3) and Kvanvig (2009) See Adler 2002: 36; Sutton 2007: 44; Unger 1975: 256; and Williamson 2000: 253-254. 19 For appeals to lottery cases in support of the knowledge view, see Hawthorne 2004: 21-24; Sutton 2007: 44; Unger 1975: 261; and Williamson 2000: 244-249. Dudman (1992) uses lottery cases to argue against the view that high (subjective) probability is sufficient for warranted assertion. Lackey (2007: 618) and Hill and Schechter (2007) claim that assertions of lottery propositions can be warranted, pointing to cases like the following. Having bought a lottery ticket and convinced it won, despite not having seen the result, I express my intention to quit my job. It appears it would be appropriate for you to say, 'Don't be crazy: your ticket didn't win'.
Such examples are not decisive. First, it seems legitimate to respond to the assertion by saying, 'You don't know that!' Second, if the assertion is appropriate, this might be due to the high practical stakes overriding (K).
If truth is the norm for assertion, one might expect it to generate a subsidiary evidential norm, according to which 'one should not make an assertion for which one lacks evidence ' (2000: 244) . (In effect, this is to suggest that one can derive (JB) from (T).) One might view this in instrumental terms: the evidential norm holds since conforming to it is the means to conforming to the truth norm. Williamson appeals instead to a general principle, not specific to assertion, concerning responsibility: if one should φ only if some condition obtains, then one should φ only if one has evidence for thinking that that condition obtains. To illustrate with his memorable example, if one should not bury the living, one should bury someone only if one has evidence that she is dead-to do otherwise is irresponsible. Returning to the lottery case, since it is extremely probable on Elliot's evidence that Stanley's ticket lost, asserting (2) would seem to satisfy any evidential norm derivable from (T). According to Williamson, the truth view cannot explain why strong probabilistic support is insufficient for warranted assertion.
Finally, (T-SUFF) seems too weak (Lackey 2007: 607 To deal with such cases, Weiner supplements his explanation by appealing to DeRose's (2002: 180) distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' propriety (a version of the idea that one might derive (JB) from (T)). According to the truth view, an assertion is warranted in the primary sense only if it expresses a truth. This generates a secondary propriety, according to which an assertion is warranted only if there is evidence that the assertion is true. In turn, Weiner continues (2005: 235) , this suggests that when an assertion is made there is a legitimate expectation that the speaker has secondary warrant for what she asserts. In the case that concerns us, the 'most likely' warrant-namely, inside information-is the kind that would put the speaker in a position to know what she asserts. Hence, Elliot's assertion of (2) is, though true and so warranted in the primary sense, unwarranted in the secondary sense, since the secondary warrant which Stanley legitimately expects to be present is lacking.
One might wonder why Stanley has reason to expect the secondary warrant for the assertion to be knowledge-affording rather than, say, merely probabilistic.
Anticipating this, Weiner appeals to another conversational norm, the maxim of Manner (Grice 1989: 27) , which requires, among other things, participants in a conversation to avoid ambiguity. According to Weiner (2005: 236) , (2) is 'ambiguous between two kinds of warrant'. In asserting (2), Elliot conversationally implicates that he has non-probabilistic warrant, since, if the warrant were merely probabilistic, he should have asserted:
(3) Your ticket almost certainly didn't win.
Since, Weiner concludes, in asserting (2), Elliot falsely implicates that there is secondary non-probabilistic warrant for doing so, his assertion is improper.
This story faces two difficulties. First, Elliot need not violate the maxim of Manner in asserting (2) in the absence of warrant sufficient for knowledge. Granting that (2) is ambiguous in the way Weiner suggests, suppose Elliot asserts (2) in a context in which it is apparent that whatever warrant there is for doing so is probabilistic. In this context, Elliot's assertion would not be ambiguous in the relevant sense (any more than it would be ambiguous to assert that the bank is busy when stood beside a river). Since here Stanley could not reasonably take Elliot to have knowledge-affording grounds for his assertion, that assertion would not generate the implicature that he does. In which case, so long as there is some probabilistic warrant for asserting (2), and assuming Stanley appears unaware of the odds that his ticket lost, Elliot's assertion violates neither the maxim of Manner nor the secondary propriety.
Nonetheless, it still seems unwarranted to assert (flat-out) that Stanley's ticket didn't win. Weiner fails to account for this.
Second, supposing that Elliot's assertion of (2) does conversationally implicate that he has knowledge-affording secondary warrant for doing so. In that case, to return to an issue raised earlier, it should be possible for Elliot to cancel the implicature by adding, 'but I don't know that the ticket didn't win'. Not only does this seem not to remove the conversational impropriety, it seems to result in a Moorean absurdity! This is an appropriate point to examine Weiner's attempt to account for Moorean assertions consistently with the truth view. Consider again:
Weiner's explanation of its absurdity exploits now-familiar ideas (2005: 237-238).
When asserting the first conjunct, he suggests, one's audience reasonably expects there to be (secondary) warrant for doing so. Since the "most likely" warrant would be knowledge-affording, one conversationally implicates that one knows that dogs bark. However, in asserting the second conjunct, one denies that there is such warrant.
Hence, Weiner concludes, asserting (1) To say that there is a reason for S to φ in the relevant sense is to say only that there exists some reason for S to φ; it is to say nothing about S's awareness of that reason or her epistemic relation to it. So, it is consistent with there being a reason for S to φ that S is ignorant of it.
To say that S has a reason to φ in the relevant sense is not merely to say that there exists some reason for S to φ, but that in some way this reason is in S's possession, that she is aware of or recognises it, that she stands in a suitable epistemic relation to it. Specifically, to say that S has a reason to φ in the relevant sense is to say that she is able to act in light of or for that reason, that she is in a position to φ because of it. Hyman (1999; .
My aim in this paper is not to argue for (POSSESSION) but to take it for granted and consider its implications for the debate concerning norms of assertion. Evidently, there is not space here to provide a conclusive case for, or comprehensive defence of, the thesis. However, some attempt to motivate it is called for. 24 The notion of having a reason this principle concerns should not be confused with that which This ticket will lose.
So, if I keep the ticket I will gain nothing.
But if I sell the ticket I will get a penny.
So, I shall sell the ticket.
Assuming that the subject has no inside information, something is wrong with this reasoning. A plausible diagnosis is that, though one can have strong grounds for accepting the first premise, one cannot know it and so, given (KPR), one should not treat the lottery proposition as a premise in one's practical reasoning. Note that, if the subject knows the first premise, the reasoning would seem acceptable, as (KPR) predicts.
If a similar thesis holds for theoretical reasoning, then one arrives at the When we prefer an hypothesis h to an hypothesis h* because h explains our evidence e better than h* does, we are standardly assuming e to be known; if we do not know e, why should h's capacity to explain e confirm h for us? It is likewise hard to see why the probability of h on e should regulate our degree of belief in h unless we know e.
Again, an incompatibility between h and e does not rule out h unless e is known (POSSESSION) refers to reasons for φing. But, as discussed above, the candidate norms for assertion concern, not when there is reason for asserting something, but when there is warrant for doing so. Whatever is to be said in favour of 30 to it, one is in a position to φ in light of the fact which warrants doing so just in case one knows that fact.
To illustrate, suppose that the fact that it is snowing is a warrant for Harry to stay indoors (given that it is snowing, Harry may go to the shops later when the weather improves). Suppose also that Harry stays indoors. It does not follow that
Harry stays indoors in light of the warrant for doing so; he might be unaware that it is snowing. While such ignorance does not change the fact that there is or exists warrant for Harry to stay indoors, it does mean that the fact that it is snowing cannot be a warrant Harry possesses (in the relevant sense) for staying indoors, that he is not in position to stay indoors in light of the fact that it is snowing, that is, with the warrant which exists for doing so.
Suppose now that Harry believes that it is snowing, having seen a weather report according to which it is snowing. Unbeknownst to Harry, the report was an elaborate hoax. Since he does not know that it is snowing, the fact that it is snowing is not a warrant which Harry possesses for staying indoors, and so he is not in a position to stay indoors in light of the fact that it is snowing, that is, with the warrant which exists for doing so. 31 To echo a point made earlier, one might allow that there is a sense in which a person can φ with a certain warrant, namely, that p, although it is false that p and so she does not know that p, so long as she believes that p and that p would have been a warrant for φing had it been the case. Be that as it may, (POSSESSION), restricted to the warrants which there actually are, suffices for present purposes.
In contrast, if Harry were to know that it is snowing, then it would be unproblematic to suppose that he is in a position to stay indoors in light of the fact that it is snowing, that is, with the warrant which exists for doing so.
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Nothing but the truth (POSSESSION) shows the knowledge view to be false while explaining why it might appear to be true. Hence, it serves both a critical and a diagnostic role. In addition,
(POSSESSION) provides a defence of the truth view.
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No doubt the case sketched above in support of (POSSESSION) is not decisive but for the remainder I shall take it for granted. In defence, note, first, that (POSSESSION) is motivated independently of the issues at stake in the debate over the norms of assertion. Hence, it is a neutral datum available to any participant in that debate and there is nothing ad hoc about appealing to it in order to defend (T) or criticise (K). Second, recall that many of the principal advocates of the knowledge view endorse (POSSESSION). At the very least, then, the argument that follows shows that they need to choose between the knowledge view and (POSSESSION). Needless to say, I recommend the latter.
It is important to keep in view that (T) states what it takes for there to be
warrant to assert that p. According to (T), there is warrant to assert that p, and so one may do so, if and only if it is true that p. So understood, (T) says nothing about what it is for one to have warrant to assert that p, or for a subject to be in a position to assert that p in the light of this warrant. This is precisely what one should expect from a 32 The arguments to follow might also provide a defence of the view that a norm of truth fundamentally governs belief and a challenge to the view that a norm of knowledge fundamentally governs belief, insofar as the arguments against the former and for the latter mirror those philosophers advance in the debate concerning assertion. For an overview of the debate concerning belief, and a rather different defence of the truth view with respect to belief, see (Whiting Forthcoming Consider again Moorean assertions, such as:
According to the truth view, it is possible for there to be warrant to assert this (i.e. for
(1) to be true). However, given (POSSESSION), it is not warrant one can have or act in the light of. If Holly has warrant to assert the first conjunct, she knows that dogs bark.
But, if she knows that dogs bark, the second conjunct is false; in which case, Holly cannot have warrant to assert it, since there is no such warrant. Conversely, if there is warrant to assert the right-hand side, then Holly doesn't know that dogs bark; in which case, Holly cannot have warrant to assert the left. So, Moorean assertions involving the notion of knowledge are absurd because in making such an assertion one represents oneself as not having the warrant to do so. Alternatively, given (T) and (POSSESSION), one cannot possibly have warrant to assert (1) and its kin.
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Consider again Elliot's assertion of:
(2) Your ticket didn't win.
If (2) is true, (T) implies that there is warrant to assert this. However, the proponent of the truth view can point out that, given (POSSESSION) and the fact that Elliot cannot know that Stanley's ticket didn't win, Elliot cannot have warrant for asserting this.
This seems adequate to account for our intuitions regarding lottery cases.
Finally, consider the charge that (T-SUFF) is too weak, since it implies that there is warrant to make true assertions on the basis of, say, irrational conviction.
Given (POSSESSION), the proponent of the truth view can argue that these are cases in which there exists warrant for the assertion, but in which the subject lacks that warrant. To be in a position to assert that p in light of the warrant for doing so requires that one know that p, and one does not know that p if one has an irrational conviction that p.
In summary, by appealing to (POSSESSION), which is independently motivated and accepted by the knowledge view's advocates, one can show that the truth view is able to account for the data which would otherwise seem to undermine it. 34 As far as 33 One might wonder how there can be warrant which no subject could have. If one finds this idea problematic, one could suggest that it is a constraint on a fact's being a reason or warrant that it could be a person's reason or warrant. I have no quarrel with this. 34 One might doubt that the considerations in light of or on the basis of which a person asserts typically concern whatever warrants doing so. What warrants or entitles a person to make an assertion is a quite different matter, one might think, from what moves her to do so or what she takes into account when doing so. When I assert that the train arrives at 8pm, for example, I might do so on the grounds that soand-so needs to catch the train and does not have a timetable to hand-I do not usually give a thought to whether the warrant for performing this speech act is present. This might suggest that one should not typically expect a subject asserting something to be doing so in light of whatever warrants doing so, which might in turn cause problems for my defence of the truth view. If my account were to assume that one should expect a subject to make an assertion simply on the grounds that the warrant for doing so obtains, it might be in trouble. But it need only assume that one should expect that whether or not there is warrant for doing so is something a subject takes into account when asserting something, that the fact that the warrant for doing so exists is among the considerations in light of which she makes an assertion, and that whether or not the subject satisfies the data goes, then, the knowledge view and the truth view are on all fours. Since the latter, unlike the former, accords with the platitudinous (C), it is tempting to conclude that the balance tips in favour of the truth view. However, since being a platitude does not preclude being contentious, I shall not rely on this point; instead, I shall argue that (POSSESSION) casts doubt on the knowledge view.
(K), like (T), is a thesis about when there is warrant to assert that p, namely, when one knows that p. 35 This, together with (POSSESSION), implies that to have warrant to assert that p, one must know that one knows that p, i.e. one must possess second-order knowledge. Alternatively, on this view, asserting in the light of the warrant to do so requires self-knowledge. This seems wrong. When a speaker asserts that p without knowing that she knows that p, it does not appear that she is asserting that p without having the warrant to do so. Surely, to have warrant to assert that p, the speaker does not need to find out about herself, specifically, about her epistemic relation to the fact that p; it seems enough for her to find out whether or not p.
Perhaps these are not arguments but appeals to intuition. To bolster them, recall the general point, not specific to assertion, that in cases where there is warrant to φ it often matters to us and our evaluation of a person whether or not she has warrant for φing. As a result, when a person φs, one can challenge her by querying whether there exists warrant for φing, or by querying whether she possesses the warrant for φing. Given this, and given (K) and (POSSESSION), we should expect challenges to assertions to come in at least two forms. If David asserts that the bank is this expectation makes a difference to how one evaluates her performance. This assumption seems unproblematic. Furthermore, note that the assumption seems especially unproblematic on the truth view. According to (TRUTH) , what warrants asserting that the train leaves at 8pm is simply the fact that the train leaves at 8pm. It is surely plausible to think that, when a subject asserts that the train leaves at 8pm, she typically takes into account whether or not it is 8pm. By the same token, it seems legitimate to expect a subject making this assertion to be doing so in light of such considerations. 35 I shall defend this claim in the following section ( §6).
closed, one might ask, 'Do you know that the bank is closed?', which would be to ask if there is warrant for David's assertion. Alternatively, on the view under consideration, one might raise a challenge by asking, 'Do you know that you know that the bank is closed?', which would be to ask if David has warrant for his assertion, if he made his assertion in light of or with the warrant for doing so. However, challenges of the latter sort are unheard of, except in very unusual contexts, and would ordinarily be excessive. If David were to fail to meet the challenge, it would surely not follow that he has no warrant for asserting that the bank is closed; after all, he might know that it is. This suggests that having warrant for assertion does not require second-order knowledge, which in turn suggests that there being warrant for assertion does not require first-order knowledge.
A proponent of the knowledge view might reply that typically we assume that a subject who knows that p also knows that she knows that p. So, returning to the example, one would not typically bother to challenge whether David knows that he knows that the bank is closed, since, if one is assured that David has the relevant firstorder knowledge, one is assured that he has the relevant second-order knowledge.
However, this reply could at most account for the fact that querying whether the subject who makes an assertion knows that she knows what she asserts is uncommon. It does not seem to explain why, as noted above, such a challenge seems excessive.
In light of (POSSESSION), the knowledge view is hard to accept. Of course, there are costs to any theory but, since the truth view is able to account for the data typically offered in support of the knowledge view, there seems no reason to pay the price.
By appeal to (POSSESSION), a proponent of the truth view is in addition able to diagnose the attraction of the knowledge view; it rests on a failure to appreciate the distinction between, and so on the conflation of, what it takes for there to be warrant for asserting and what it takes for a subject to have that warrant, to be in a position to assert with or in the light of it. Moreover, since our evaluations of assertions sometimes track, not simply the existence of warrant but also its possession, the data concerning those evaluations, which in large part motivates the knowledge view, encourages such a conflation. Given (POSSESSION), it is no surprise that knowledge might appear to be the norm of assertion, that, whenever someone asserts, the question of whether she knows what she asserts is a live one. about the relation a subject must stand in to the truth if she is to be in a position to 36 One might think that some version of the truth view in conjunction with (POSSESSION) delivers some version of the knowledge view. Suppose that the warrant to assert that p is the fact that p. Suppose further that one should not φ unless one has (in the relevant sense) the warrant for φing. It follows, given (POSSESSION), that one should not assert that p unless one knows that p. If this line of thought is correct, then a proponent of the truth view might still claim to have shown, contra the knowledge view as it is usually presented (see Williamson 2000: 11) , that truth provides the fundamental norm for assertion and so that the knowledge norm is at best derivative. However, I think that the proponent of the truth view should reject the line of thought on the grounds that the principle that one should not φ unless one possesses the warrant for φing is false. assert with the warrant for doing so, and it hardly follows from the mere fact that p that a subject is able to assert in light of the warrant for doing so-after all, she might not even believe that p. 38 Recall also that proponents of the knowledge view do not say of a lottery case in which one (truly) asserts that one's ticket lost that, though there is warrant for the assertion, it is not warrant one asserts in light of-the position I defend in §5-but that in such cases warrant is simply lacking. 39 To make a related point in a somewhat tendentious way, the objection at hand seems to turn the knowledge view from a thesis concerning the normative reasons for and against asserting that p into a thesis concerning what can be a subject's motivating reasons for asserting that p, when the debate at hand was supposed to be precisely over the norms of assertion.
and secondary warrant, one can ask what it takes to have it. According to (POSSESSION), and following the previous proposal, to have primary warrant to assert that p one must know that p, while to have secondary warrant to assert that p one must know the facts that provide evidence that p.
Note also that the primary/secondary distinction is motivated by very different considerations than those which motivate the being/having warrant distinction. The former is encouraged in large part by reflection on what calls for praise and blame, or by thinking about the predicament of a subject who needs to act without access to all the facts, reflection and thinking which seems to call for the introduction of (secondary) norm to which the subject's assertions might answer which is less demanding than the supposedly fundamental (primary) norm. This is simply not the way in which the being/having distinction is motivated (see §4 above) and, moreover, having warrant for one's assertion-in the sense spelled out by (POSSESSION)-is a more, not less, demanding business than there being warrant for that assertion.
So, whether there is a distinction between primary and secondary propriety and how to understand it is simply a separate issue from that of whether there is a distinction between there being and a subject's having warrant and how to understand it.
Concluding remarks
Knowledge is not the norm for assertion-truth is. But it is no surprise to find that in evaluating a subject making an assertion our focus is often on whether or not she knows what she asserts. There is warrant to assert that spring has sprung just in case it is true that spring has sprung but one has this warrant and is in a position to act in light of it just in case one knows that spring has sprung.
One might think that it is a strike against the truth view that, in order to defend it, one has to appeal to a potentially controversial thesis, namely (POSSESSION), and in doing so draw on resources from other areas of philosophy or ideas which do not form part of the common ground on which the debate concerning the norms of assertion proceeds. However, surely it is entirely proper to think that to resolve a dispute about the normative considerations pertaining to the act of assertion one needs to turn to the philosophy of normativity and the philosophy of action and, in doing so, to situate a local debate in a larger theoretical context. Moreover, though I have not shown that (POSSESSION) is true-which is clearly beyond the scope of this paper-it is a principle many proponents of the knowledge view already accept and the arguments in its favour do not concern the norms of assertion.
In closing, it is worth asking what would explain the fact that there exists a speech act, namely assertion, governed by (T)? It does not seem difficult to answer this, so long as one keeps in view that the norm claims only that one may assert truths, not that one ought to, and that one may not assert falsehoods. Falsehoods are liable to mislead and those who hear false assertions are receiving misinformation. Arguably, it is finally bad to believe falsely; in any event, to do so is instrumentally bad (other things being equal), since false beliefs thwart one's ability to satisfy one's desires and plans. In contrast, it is less easy to see why the knowledge view should be correct.
According to (K), one may not assert propositions one does not know. But why, since those propositions might be true (and, indeed, justified) ? One might appeal to the thought that knowledge is better than anything which falls short of it. Even if that is true, and it is notoriously difficult to show that it is, it does not follow that true belief is bad, only that it is not as good as knowledge. It remains unclear, then, why it would be the case that one may not assert truths which are not known.
